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NOTES
PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS:
UNION SECURITY AGREEMENTS IN
THE PUBLIC SECTOR SINCE ABOOD
I. INTRODUCTION
The growing demand for greater and more comprehensive
government services has caused the public workforce to almost
double in the last two decades.1 During these years, public em-
ployees intensified their demands for organizational rights en-
joyed by private sector workers, including the right to a recog-
nized and exclusive representative of their own choice and the
right to bargain collectively for wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment. Although no uniform federal
legislation protects the bargaining rights of public employees,
3
state and local governments by the mid-1970s demonstrated a
growing tendency toward recognition of these demands.' By
1976, nearly half of all full-time public workers belonged to some
employee organization, and membership figures for teachers and
firefighters approached seventy percent.5
This dramatic increase in the number of jurisdictions af-
fected by the presence of an actual or potential bargaining entity
1. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Dep't of Commerce, Report of July 1976, 71 Gov'T
EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 2001 (Reference file 1979).
2. Zwerdling, The Liberation of Public Employees: Union Security in the Public
Sector, 17 B.C. INDUS. COM. L. REv. 993 (1976). Prior to the 1960s, collective bargaining
was virtually nonexistent in the public sector and, in most jurisdictions, was affirmatively
illegal. See generally Blair, State Legislative Control Over the Conditions of Public Em-
ployment: Defining the Scope of Collective Bargaining for State and Municipal Em-
ployees, 26 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1973).
3. Government employees are expressly excluded from coverage of the Taft-Hartley
Act. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976).
4. For a list of states with statutes recognizing public sector collective bargaining in
1975, see Blair, Union Security Agreements in Public Employment, 60 CORNELL L. REV.
183 n.8 (1975).
5. 71 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 2002 (Reference fie 1979).
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led to concern about the legitimate scope of collective bargaining
in the public sector, especially when it raised the question of
union security: might a public employer and an exclusive bar-
gaining agent reach an agreement that would require every
member of the bargaining unit, as a condition of employment,
either to become a union member or to pay a specified amount
to the union in return for its representative services? The
United States Supreme Court in Abood v. Detroit Board of Edu-
cations indicated that these requirements might be permissible
in certain circumstances. This Note will discuss that decision
and its effects on the development of union security in the pub-
lic sector.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNION SECURITY
Several forms of union security have developed, 'including
the closed shop, union shop, agency shop, maintenance of mem-
bership, and service fee or fair share agreements.' A closed shop
permits an employer to hire only union members and conditions
employment on continued membership. A union shop allows the
employer to hire anyone he chooses but requires all workers to
join the union within a specified period of time. The agency
shop requires employees who do not wish to become union mem-
bers to pay the union a sum equal to or less than the amount of
regular dues and fees. Maintenance of membership agreements
do not demand union membership but require those who volun-
tarily join to maintain their membership for the term of the
union contract. Fair share or service fee arrangements compel
nonmembers to pay a fee in the amount of that portion of dues
devoted to collective bargaining activities.8
In the private sector, the National Labor Relations Act 9 and
the Railway Labor Act10 have long permitted all forms of union
security except the closed shop.11 No uniform federal legislation
6. 431 U.S. 209 (1977). For a discussion of Abood, see notes 33-50 and accompanying
text infra.
7. K. HANSLOWE, D. DUNN & J. ERSTLING, UNION SECURITY IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMEN'r.
OF FREE RIDING AND FREE ASSOCIATON 4 (1978).
8. Id.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3),(b)(2) (1976).
10. 45 U.S.C. § 152 Eleventh (1976).
11. For a discussion of the development of federal legislation concerning union se-
curity, see Blair, supra note 4, at 186-87.
[Vol. 33
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governs union security in the public sector, however, and the au-
thority of public employers to enter into union security agree-
ments depends entirely on state law. Although no state except
Vermont legislatively authorized union security before the
1970s,12 public sector agreements commonly contain union se-
curity clauses,1 and their legitimacy has been hotly contested. 4
Two competing objectives form the basis of the controversy:
individual autonomy versus majority welfare. Opponents of
union security agreements perceive them as a restraint on the
individual freedom of both employers and employees and argue
that individual merit-rather than union membership or partici-
pation-should determine continued employment.1 5 Moreover,
the opponents disapprove of the use of a state's coercive power
to mandate union association and regard compulsory union affil-
iation as an infringement on objecting employees' freedom of
speech and association under the first and fourteenth amend-
ments, and their right to work under the due process clauses of
the fifth and fourteenth amendments.16 Thus, attempts to ex-
pand union security into the public sector have met staunch op-
position, and the Right to Work Committee has mounted a na-
tional campaign to dismantle all vestiges of compulsory
unionism.17
12. Schneider, Public-Sector Labor Legislation-An Evolutionary Analysis, in B.
AARON, J. GRODIN & J. STERN, PUBLIc-SEcTOR BARGAINING 217 (1979). The Vermont stat-
ute was passed in 1969. Id. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1722, 1726 (1978).
13. Schneider, supra note 12, at 217. In 1972, the Michigan Education Association
stated that almost one-half of its 530 contracts contained agency shop provisions. Id. at
217 n.84.
14. See generally H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 2
(1971); Clark, Politics and Public Employee Unionism: Some Recommendations for an
Emerging Problem, 44 U. CIN. L. REv. 680, 681 (1975); Zwerdling, supra note 2, at 1009-
13. One author noted that a mere list of articles on the topic occupied over twenty-three
typed pages. Pollitt, Right to Work Law Issues: An Evidentiary Approach, 37 N.C.L.
REV. 233, 234 n.6 (1959).
15. See Blair, supra note 4, at 187-89, in which the author advances the proposition
that in most civil service systems "merit" principles have always been subordinated to
other legitimate public policy goals.
16. See generally T. HAGGARD, COMPULSORY UNIONISM, THE NLRB, AND THE COURTS
271-84 (1977); Levinson, After Abood: Public Sector Union Security and the Protection
of Individual Public Employee Rights, 27 Am. U.L. REV. 1, 2 (1977).
17. The March 1981 CONSERVATIVE DIGEST portrays Right to Work Committee presi-
dent Reed Larson as a "David astride Goliath," and recounts the story of his twenty-five
year "'orchestrated'" fight against compulsory unionism. "'Time and again the Right to
Work Committee has gone to the mat with union moguls and their Congressional allies,'
.1982]
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Proponents of union security maintain that collective em-
ployee strength is. necessary to counter the economic power of
employers and that financial and organizational stability are es-
sential to the meaningful exercise of that strength."8 Moreover,
because an exclusive representative is charged with the legal
duty of fairly representing all members of the bargaining unit,2"
simple reciprocity dictates that those who receive the benefits of
union representation should contribute their fair share of its
cost.20 So long as union security agreements require no more
than financial support, the conflict centers not on "a unique is-
sue of freedom" but rather on "one of union power and labor
stability.
'21
The United States Supreme Court has construed the con-
gressional intent behind federal labor law as embodying the lat-
ter policy. In Railway Employees' Department v. Hanson,22 the
Court held that "the requirement for financial support of the
collective-bargaining agency by all who receive the benefits of its
work. . . does not violate either the First or the Fifth Amend-
ments, '23 but noted in dictum that the financial support it
found unobjectionable related only to the work of the union in
collective bargaining.
24
The constitutionality of using compulsory dues to support
political causes that are contrary to the views of dissenting em-
ployees was challenged in International Association of Machin-
ists v. Street.25 The Supreme Court skirted the constitutional
'and time and again its supporters have come away with their heads held high, dis-
playing the spirit of individual freedom that made America great.'" National Right to
Work Newsletter, March 31, 1981, at 3, col. 1 (quoting CONSERVATIVE DIGEST, Mar. 1981,
at 15).
18. See Zwerdling, supra note 2, at 1012-13.
19. Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944).
20. The union's traditional attitude toward "free riders" was eloquently expressed
by former American Federation of Labor president Samuel Gompers: "Nonunionists who
reap the rewards of union efforts, without contributing a dollar or risking the loss of a
day, are parasites. They are reaping the benefits of union spirit, while they themselves
are debasing genuine manhood." 12 AMERICAN FEDERATIONISTS 221 (1905), cited in Com-
ment, Union Security in the Public Sector: Defining Political Expenditures Related to
Collective Bargaining, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 134 n.6.
21. H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, supra note 14, at 96.
22. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
23. Id. at 238.
24. Id. at 235.
25. 367 U.S. 740 (1961). The Right to Work Committee has vehemently protested
[Vol. 33
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issue that such a use violated the first amendment rights of dis-
senters by construing the Railway Labor Act as prohibiting the
union's use of exacted funds for political purposes over an em-
ployee's objection.26 Because the majority refused to "delineate
the precise limits" of a prohibited political expenditure, the
scope of the holding is not entirely clear.27 Justice Douglas, in a
concurring opinion, indicated that membership in a group could
not be conditioned on an individual's acceptance of that group's
philosophy without substantial infringement of his first amend-
ment rights.2 8 Douglas implied, however, that a union could use
an objector's money for purposes of a political nature if the use
related to the reasons for which the union was organized: "[t]he
furtherance of the common cause leaves some leeway for the
leadership of the group. As long as they act to promote the cause
which justified bringing the group together, the individual can-
not withdraw his financial support merely because he disagrees
with the group's strategy."29 1
The failure of the court in Street to define adequately the
parameters of its political prohibition within the private sector
left even less certain the constitutionality of public sector union
security. 0 In the public sector, not only are the negotiators gov-
this type of expenditure: "Compulsory union contracts covering government employees
can become the most reprehensible form of 'sweetheart agreement'. . . in which incum-
bent office holders obtain union campaign support in exchange for forcing all employees
to hand over dues to union treasuries." Larson, Compulsory Unionism is not the Way,
Federalist Times (Jan. 2, 1974) cited in Nelson, Union Security in the Public Sector, 27
LAB. L.J. 334, 340 (1976).
26. 367 U.S. at 768-69. In Street, the record did reveal that the union had financed
the campaigns of federal and state political candidates whom the plaintiff opposed and
had promoted "political and economic doctrines, concepts, and ideologies with which he
disagreed." Id. at 744. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Harlan in a dissenting opin-
ion, found no violation of first amendment rights. Id. at 806 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Justice Black, dissenting, reached the opposition conclusion. Id. at 789-91 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
27. Id. at 768.
28. Id. at 777 (Douglas, J. concurring). Citing Hanson, Douglas noted that certain
restrictions by a union could not be supported by state or federal governments: disquali-
fication from membership for political views or associations; limitations on certain kinds
of speech or activity; or the required use of union funds "for purposes other than collec-
tive bargaining." Id. at 777 n.3. The use of union dues for broad ideological purposes
such as promoting birth control or foreign policy positions or financing the campaigns of
particular political candidates clearly falls within Douglas' prohibited category. Id. at
777-78.
29. Id. at 778.
30. Blair, supra note 4, at 194-99. "[T]he lack of federal legislation susceptible of an
5
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ernment officials, but they bargain over subject matter that is
almost always directly affected by some prior political decision.
Moreover, many collective bargaining contracts are subject to
final approval or rejection by a legislative body. Viewed from a
broad perspective, the entire public sector collective bargaining
process is essentially political, and any compulsory financial
contribution from objecting employees might be challenged as
falling within the Street proscription."1
III. THE Abood DECISION
The Supreme Court did not again address the proper scolpe
of union security provisions until May 1977.32 In Abood v. De-
troit Board of Education,3 dissident teachers alleging depriva-
tion of their freedom of association under the first and four-
teenth amendments challenged a Michigan statute3 authorizing
an agency shop agreement with a local government employer.
3 5
After the Michigan Court of Appeals upheld the statute under
Hanson" the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that
compulsory support of a collective bargaining representative af-
fected the employees' first amendment interests 7 but held, on
the authority of the private sector decisions in Hanson and
Street, that "such interference as exists is constitutionally justi-
fled by the legislative assessment" that union security agree-
ments contribute to labor peace and stability8 and equitably
interpretation like the one placed on the RLA..." made unavoidable a first amend-
ment challenge and ruling. Id. at 194.
31. Id. at 194-96. For a discussion of the inherently political nature of public sector
bargaining, see H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, supra note 14, at 29-32, 60-65; Summers,
Public Sector Bargaining: Problems of Governmental Decision-Making, 44 U. CIN. L.
REv. 669 (1975).
32. One commentator has suggested that the lack of litigation during this period
may indicate that the issue is more academic than real. Comment, supra note 20, at 141
n.43.
33. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
34. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423. 210(1)(c) (1978).
35. The complaint alleged that the union spent a substantial portion of the agency
shop fees for social activities not available to nonmembers and for the support of various
"economic, political, professional, scientific, and religious" activities to which the plain-
tiffs objected. 431 U.S. at 213.
36. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 60 Mich. App. 92, 230 N.W.2d 322" (1975). The
Supreme Court of Michigan denied review. 431 U.S. at 216.
37. 431 U.S. at 222.
35. Id. at 222-23 (citing the Douglas concurrence in Street). See notes 28 & 29 and
[Vol. 33526
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distribute the costs of fair representation. 9 Moreover, the same
important government interests that justified interference with
the rights of private workers were deemed to "presumptively
support" impingement upon the associational freedoms of gov-
ernment employees.40
The Court agreed that the first amendment prohibited the
use of compulsory fees for purely political or ideological pur-
poses but rejected the plaintiff's assertion that, because public
bargaining was by its very nature "political," Hanson precluded
any forced use of fees.41 The majority acknowledged that identi-
fying activities essential to effective bargaining for which contri-
butions may be compelled is much more difficult in the public
sector than in the private sector. It further recognized that the
process of reaching a collective bargaining agreement may re-
quire approval at several levels of government and that activities
traditionally viewed as political-such as legislative appropria-
tions and budget decisions-may thus become an integral part
of the bargaining process. Although the Court suggested that
union expenditures for these activities might be permissible, it
declined to define a "dividing line. ' 42 The Court also expressly
refused to rule on the propriety of expenditures for social or
other activities that benefit only union members and are clearly
unrelated to the representative function.43
Finally, the Court indicated that the remedy it had fash-
ioned for private sector employees' rights in Railway Clerks v.
Allen" was equally applicable in the public sector." Under Al-
len, only those employees who object to political use of their
dues are entitled to relief,46 and a declaration of opposition to
accompanying text supra.
39. 431 U.S. at 222-23.
40. Id. at 225.
41. Id. at 235-36.
42. Id. at 236. The case reached the Supreme Court after a judgment on the plead-
ings with no evidentiary record. Because neither party had briefed or argued the issue of
which specific union activities could properly be considered germane to the bargaining
process, the Court held only that the general allegations of the complaint, if proved,
established a cause of action under the first and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 236-37.
43. Id. at 236 n.33. "Without greater specificity... and the benefit of adversary
argument, we leave those questions . . . to the Michigan courts." Id.
44. 373 U.S. 113 (1963).
45. See 431 U.S. at 241-42.
46. This requirement was initially set forth in Street, 367 U.S. at 774.
1982] 527
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any sort of ideological expenditure is sufficient.47 Furthermore,
because only the union possesses the necessary documentation,
it has the burden of proving that compulsory dues have been
allocated for permissible expenditures. 4 The Court in Allen
then specified the appropriate remedy as, first, a partial refund
of extracted fees in the same proportion that the union's politi-
cal expenditures bore to its total outlays and, second, the reduc-
tion of future exactions by the same percentage. 49 The Court
also found that the most desirable solution, in terms of economi-
cal judicial administration, would be the union's voluntary de-
velopment of internal procedures that embody the enumerated
features."
IV. STATE LAW SINCE Abood
A. Absence of Statutory Authorization of Union
Security
Because no uniform federal legislation governs union security
in the public sector,51 the authority of public employers to enter
into union security agreements depends entirely upon state law.
In those states whose law is silent on the question of public sec-
tor bargaining, the majority view denies the existence of a com-
47. 373 U.S. at 118.
48. Id. at 122. To require identification of specific expenditures would force the em-
ployee either to relinquish his right to withhold his support from objectionable ideologi-
cal causes or to relinquish his freedom to maintain his own beliefs without public disclo-
sure. 431 U.S. at 241.
49. 373 U.S. at 122.
50. Id. at 122.
51. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) expressly excludes state and local
government workers. Federal employees were guaranteed the right to refrain from union
activity under President Kennedy's Executive Order. Exec. Order No. 10,988 § (1)(a) 3
C.F.R. 521 (1959-1963 compilation). In 1969, President Nixon revised the rules governing
federal labor relations to make it clear that no form of union security could be negoti-
ated: "nothing in the agreement shall require an employee to become or to remain a
member of a labor organization, or to pay money ... except pursuant to a voluntary
written authorization ... " Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 12(c) 3 C.F.R. 861 (1966-70 com-
pilation) (1969).
Both the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 and the Civil Service Reform Act of
1978 permit only voluntary checkoffs; however, once authorized, the dues deductions are
irrevocable for the period of one year. 39 U.S.C. § 1205(a); 5 U.S.C. § 7115(a). Attempts
to expand union security in the federal sector have been consistently defeated, due
largely to the efforts of the National Right to Work Committee and conservative lobbies.
See note 17 supra.
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mon-law right to negotiate. 2 For various policy reasons,5 3 many
other states have enacted broad right-to-work guarantees either
legislatively or by constitutional mandate.5" All of these states
expressly forbid compulsory union membership as a condition of
employment, and several also prohibit the exaction of agency or
service fees. 5 Application of these restraints to public and pri-
vate employers proscribes the negotiation of union security
provisions."
A third group of states have bargaining laws that are silent
on the subject of union security, and a different problem arises.
Most public bargaining legislation defines the scope of negotia-
tions in language similar to that of the National Labor Relations
Act--"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment. ' 57 Although this language is flexible enough to encompass
all forms of union security, it is usually accompanied by a provi-
sion that either guarantees employees the right to refrain from
52. E.g., Commonwealth v. County Bd., 217 Va. 558, 232 S.E.2d 30 (1977); Churchill
v. S.A.D. No. 49 Teachers' Ass'n, 380 A.2d 186 (Me. 1977).
53. See generally T. HAGGARD, supra note 16, at 172-90.
54. See ALA. CODE §§ 25-7-30 to -36 (1975); ARIz. CONST. amend. 34; ARiz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 23-1301 to -1307 (1971); ARK. CONST. amend. 34; ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 81-202
to -205 (1960); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6; FLA. STAT. § 447.17 (Supp. 1979); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 54-901 to -909 (1974); IowA REV. STAT. §§ 731.4, .5 (1979); KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 12;
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:981 to 987 (West Supp. 1981); Miss. CONST. art. 7, § 198-A;
MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-1-47 (1972); NEB. CONST. art. 15, §§ 13-15; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-
217 to -219 (1974); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 613.230 to -300 (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-78
to -84 (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 34-01-14, -08-02 (1980); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-7-10 to
7-90 (1976); S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 2; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 60-8-3 to -8 (1978);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 50-208 to -212 (1955); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 5154 a, 5154
g, 5207 a (Vernon 1971); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-34-1 to 17 (1974); VA. CODE §§ 40.1-58 to
-69 (1981); Wyo. STAT. §§ 27-7-108 to -115 (1977).
55. Statutory prohibitions exist in Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Wyo-
ming. ALA. CODE § 25-7-34 (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-202 (1960); GA. CODE ANN. §§
54-903 to -907 (1974); IOWA REV. STAT. §§ 731.4, .5 (1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23: 983
(West Supp. 1981); Miss. CODE ANN. § 71-1-47(d) (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-217
(1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-82 (1965); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-7-30(3) (1976); TENN. CODE.
ANN. § 50-210 (1955); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-34-10 (1974); VA. CODE §§ 40.1-62 (1981);
Wyo. STAT. § 27-7-111 (1977). The remaining states generally have prohibited agency
fees by attorney general or judicial construction of their statutes. The power of states to
create such restrictions under § 14(b) of the NLRA was acknowledged by the Supreme
Court in Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746 (1963). See T. HAG-
GARD, supra note 16, at 173.
56. See, e.g., Florida Educ. Ass'n v. Public Employees Relations Comm'n., 346 So.2d
551 (Fla. App. 1977); State Employees Ass'n v. Mills, 115 N.H. 473, 344 A.2d 6 (1974).
57. E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1722(4) (1959).
9
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union participation" or forbids employers from coercing em-
ployees to exercise their organizational rights.8 9 In states with
such a provision, the prevailing view is that union security provi-
sions violate the plain meaning of existing bargaining laws.e0
Typical is the position of the Michigan Supreme Court in
Smigel v. Southgate Community School District,61 in which the
majority noted that the legislature, in modeling the Michigan
Public Employment Relations Act6 2 after federal private-sector
law, had deliberately omitted a provision permitting union shop
agreements."' The court inferred from this omission a legislative
intent to prohibit union security commitments in government
employment relations. Comparable interpretations have been
given to similar statutes in Maine6 4 and California.6 5 Courts in
these states, focusing on express statutory authorization of
union security for other employment categories,"6 have con-
strued "right to refrain" language as prohibiting any exaction of
dues or their equivalent as a condition of employment. Absence
of express authorization, therefore, is generally dispositive of the
issue.6
7
58. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153a(a) (Supp. 1980); N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAw § 202
(McKinney 1973).
59. E.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 423.210 (1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 39-31-
401(1) (1979).
60. See, e.g., City of Hayward v. United Pub. Employees, 54 Cal. App. 3d 761, 126
Cal. Rptr. 710 (1976); Farrigan v. Helsby, 42 A.D.2d 265, 346 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1973).
61. 388 Mich. 531, 202 N.W.2d 305 (1972).
62. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 423.210 (1978).
63. 388 Mich. at 539-43, 202 N.W.2d at 306-08.
64. Churchill, 380 A.2d at 186.
65. City of Hayward, 54 Cal. App. 3d 761, 126 Cal. Rptr. 710.
66. Id. at 767; 126 Cal. Rptr. at 713; Churchill, 380 A.2d at 189.
67. When the New York Legislature amended the Taylor Law to permit agency
shop agreements, it expressly provided that the amendment would apply notwithstand-
ing other provisions of law. This amendment included a "right to refrain" section that
had been interpreted by the New York courts to preclude union security clauses. Note,
New York's Legislative Response to Abood v. Detroit Board of Education: Agency Shop
and Public Employee Right to Freedom of Association, 43 ALB. L. REV. 567, 577 n.70
(1979).
One unusual exception to the general rule is an early New Hampshire decision,
Tremblay v. Berlin Police Union, 108 N.H. 416, 237 A.2d 668 (1968), which concerned a
municipal police department that had entered into a union shop contract. The court
upheld the agreement in the absence of express statutory approval. The determinative
consideration appears to have been the court's failure to perceive any directly conflicting
state laws or overriding contrary policies. See id. at 422-23, 237 A.2d at 672-73.
10
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B. Express Statutory Authorization of Union Security
A minority of seventeen states now have laws affirmatively au-
thorizing some type of union security provision for public em-
ployees."' The forms of union security authorized include union
shops,69 maintenance of membership agreements, 70 agency
shops,7 1 and service or fair share arrangements. Only a few
states provide automatic grants of union security to the certified
exclusive representative."3
An important question raised by statutes authorizing union
security is the impact of these laws on preexisting statutory
rights. The majority view apparently holds that prior provisions
are subordinate to the more recent bargaining laws. The Dela-
68. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.110(b) (1972) (all public employees); CAL. Gov'T CODE §
3540.1(i) (West 1980) (public school employees), § 3515 (West 1980) (state employees);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 5-280 (Supp. 1981) (state employees); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-4
(1976) (all public employees); Ky. REV. STAT. § 345.050(1)(c) (1977) (firefighters); ME.
REV. ANN. tit. 26, § 1027(3) (Supp. 1981) (university employees); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 150E, § 12 (West Supp. 1981) (all public employees); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §
423.210(1)(c) (1978) (all public employees); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.65(2) (West Supp.
1981) (all public employees); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 59-1605(1)(c) (Supp. 1977) (all
public employees); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13 A-5.5 (West Supp. 1981) (all public employ-
ees); N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 208(3) (McKinney Supp. 1980) (state and municipal employ-
ees); OR. REV. STAT. § 243.672(c) (1979) (all public employees); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §
1101.705 (Purdon Supp. 1980) (all public employees); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-11-2 (Supp.
1980) (state employees); § 28-9.3-7 (Supp. 1980) (teachers); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
1726(8) (1978) (municipal employees); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.56.122(A)(1) (Supp.
1981) (all public employees except teachers); Wis. STAT. § 111.70(2) (1977) (municipal
employees), § 111.81(6) (1974) (state employees).
69. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.110(b) (1972); Ky. REV. STAT. § 345.050(1)(c) (1977); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1027 (Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1726(8) (1978);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.56.122(A)(1) (Supp. 1981).
70. CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 3540.1(i) (West 1980); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.705
(Purdon Supp. 1980).
71. CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 3540.1(i) (West 1980); MicH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §
423.210(1)(c) (1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 59-1605(1)(c) (Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 34:13A-5.5 (West Supp. 1981); N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 208(3) (McKinney Supp.
1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-11-2 (Supp. 1980).
72. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 5-280 (Supp. 1981); HAWAii REV. STAT. § 89-4 (1976); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 12 (West Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.65(2) (West
Supp. 1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 243.672(c) (1979); Wis. STAT. § 111.70(2) (1977).
73. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 5-280 (Supp. 1981), HAWAii REV. STAT. § 89-4 (1976), and
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.65 (West Supp. 1981) mandate fair share agreement with the
exclusive representative, while N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 208(3) (McKinney Supp. 1980) and
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-11-2 (Supp. 1980) require agency shops. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
150E, § 12 (West Supp. 1981), WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.06.150 (Supp. 1981), and Wis.
STAT. § 111.80 (1974 & Supp. 1981) automatically grant fair share agreements after a
separate majority vote of unit employees.
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ware Supreme Court, for example, has held that a technician
considered a permanent employee under a prior merit system
was properly discharged for failing to comply with the union se-
curity terms of a collective bargaining contract.7 The court in-
ferred from the bargaining statute's enactment 5 a legislative in-
tent that contracts entered into in accordance with that statute's
provisions should supersede conflicting prior legislation.7 6 A
Michigan court similarly recognized a "positive repugnancy" be-
tween that state's teacher-tenure laws and its collective bargain-
ing statute.77
A minority of jurisdictions attempt to harmonize the terms
of conflicting enactments rather than assume a direct conflict.78
These courts take the position that collective bargaining serves
the ultimate goal of labor peace and that union security provi-
sions enhance the ability of unions to engage in meaningful ne-
gotiations. Individual states vary widely, however, in their ap-
proach to ensuring union stability while at the same time
protecting minority rights.
1. Requirements of Membership.-Statutory requirements
of formal membership in the representative organization are rel-
atively rare in the public sector. The Court in Abood noted that
the constitutionality of membership requirement in addition to
financial support has not yet been decided .7  Formal member-
ship in a union generally requires adherence to union rules of
conduct, which may compel attendance at all regularly sched-
uled meetings or participation in majority-authorized strikes. A
state requirement that employees assume these obligations as a
condition of employment raises serious questions of impaired as-
74. Peterson v. Hall, 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3353 (Del. 1980).
75. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5949(c) (1979).
76. 105 L.R.R.M. at 3355.
77. Detroit Bd. of Educ. v. Parks, 98 Mich. App. 22, 296 N.W.2d 815 (1980).
78. One Oregon decision, Carlson v. City of Portland, 45 Or. App. 439, 608 P.2d 1198
(1980), construed the "just cause" language in a city charter to include all rules and
regulations reasonably related to the improvement of public services. Rules created pur-
suant to a nondiscriminatory collective bargaining contract that were not in conflict with
other state laws were therefore presumed to be reasonable and enforceable. Id. at 448,
608 P.2d at 1202. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in an attempt to harmonize its stat-
utes, simply stated that a union security provision allowing discharge for nonpayment of
dues created an exception to the Public School Code. Dauphin County Teachers Ass'n v.
School Bd., 483 Pa. 604, 398 A.2d 168 (1978). But see 1977 Op. Calif. Att'y Gen. No. CV
77/56 (cited in 742 GOV'T. EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 13 (1977)).
79. 431 U.S. at 217.
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sociational freedom.80
The membership terms in most statutory provisions have
not been interpreted by the courts. The state of Washington's
civil service law, however, which expressly permits the negotia-
tion of a union shop,8' has been rather tortuously construed as
precluding any requirement of formal association with a repre-
sentative organization. The Washington Supreme Court has held
that, because membership under the statute extends only to the
payment of dues and not to the payment of any other fees, the
legislature must have contemplated only an agency shop ar-
rangement.8 2 The court noted that the major advantage of the
agency shop is that it requires a sharing of the cost of exclusive
representation but allows nonmembers to refrain from participa-
tion in union activities they oppose.8s Citing Abood, the majority
pointed out that the required relationship did not infringe on
first amendment rights because it was not membership in the
usual sense but "rather [was] akin to a buyer-seller or debtor-
creditor relationship for collective bargaining services rendered
... ," Although the Washington court's statutory construc-
tion seems strained, it exemplifies the movement of modern ju-
risdictions away from the associational restrictions inherent in a
80. See Blair, supra note 4, at 197.
81. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.06.150(12) (Supp. 1981) provides:
That for purposes of this clause membership in the certified exclusive bargain-
ing representative shall be satisfied by the payment of monthly or other peri-
odic dues and shall not require payment of initiation, reinstatement or any
other fees or fines and shall include full and complete membership rights: and
provided further, that in order to safeguard the right of non-association...
such public employee shall pay to the union, for purposes within the program
of the union as designated by such employee that would be in harmony with
his individual conscience, an amount of money equivalent to regular union
dues minus any included monthly premiums for union sponsored insurance
programs, and such employee shall not be a member of the union but shall be
entitled to all the representation rights of a union member.
82. -Association of Capitol Powerhouse Eng'rs. v. State, 89 Wash. 2d 177, 187, 570
P.2d 1042, 1048 (1977).
83. Id. at 180-81, 570 P.2d at 1044 (quoting Zwerdling, supra note 2, at 1007-08).
84. Id. at 187, 570 P.2d at 1048. The court also noted that employees who objected
to union membership on religious grounds were allowed to deduct the cost of "members
only" benefits. Id. at 181, 570 P.2d at 1045. The court failed to explain, however, why
religious objectors were also specifically exempted from membership in the union, while
the limiting language on fees paid by other employees contained no such provision. One
commentator has pointed out that this difference "intimates" legislative contemplation
of formal membership for the majority of workers. See T. HAGGARD, supra note 16, at
219.
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union shop toward the more equitable agency shop or service fee
arrangements.
2. Religious Exemptions.-Although Washington and sev-
eral other states provide some form of express statutory protec-
tion for the rights of dissident workers whose objections are
based on religious grounds,8 the scope of that protection is far
from clear. Most of these statutes require that the exemption be
based either on membership in a bona fide religious sect8 6 or on
bona fide religious convictions founded on the doctrine of a for-
mal sect. 7 Little judicial discussion of these terms has occurred,
but several courts have narrowly construed the statutory exemp-
tions. For example, a recent Washington decision 8 held that the
state's religious exemption applied only to members of actual re-
ligious bodies or churches and not to individuals asserting purely
personal beliefs.89 In a similar Oregon case,90 a school teacher
argued that deeply held personal beliefs9 1 entitled her to both
statutory and constitutional protection. The Oregon Court of
Appeals agreed with the union that the statute required a letter
from the employee's pastor reciting the length of her church
membership and confirming that such membership precluded
union association. The court held that, even assuming the exis-
tence of religious beliefs entitled to constitutional protection,
the employee had failed to demonstrate a nexus between those
beliefs and her unwillingness to join or support the union.
9 2
The absence of an applicable state law may not preclude
85. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.110(b) (1972); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3540.1(i) (West 1980);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 59-1605(1)(c) (Supp. 1977); OR REV. STAT. § 243.672(c) (1979);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1726(8) (1978). The NLRA has recently been amended to pro-
vide for similar protection.
86. E.g., MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 39-31-204(1) (1979).
87. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.225 (Supp. 1980). See also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
1726b(11) (1978) which, in addition to the general antidiscrimination clause, prohibits a
union from seeking the discharge of an employee who has refused membership for rea-
sons of religious belief. No alternative form of payment is provided in the statute.
88. Grant v. Spellman, [1980], 854 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 16, 16-17 (Wash.
Super. Ct., Feb. 6, 1980).
89, Id. at 17.
90. Gorham v. Roseburg Educ. Ass'n, 39 Or. App. 231, 592 P.2d 228 (1979).
91. Plaintiff asserted the following personal tenets: faith in human potentialities; a
commitment to further the ethical life of mankind; faith in the democratic process and
its underlying ethical principles; and a commitment to the process of critical thinking
and methods of free and honest inquiry. Id. at 234, 592 P.2d at 229.
92. Id. at 236, 592 P.2d at 230-31.
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religious challenges to the use of compulsory fees on other
grounds. A Michigan circuit court sustained one employee's at-
tack under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act."3 The plaintiff
sought a declaratory judgment allowing her to pay the
equivalent of union dues to a charitable organization. Dismissing
as groundless speculation the union's fears that this alternative
would lead to a mass exodus of its membership, the court held
that, absent a showing of hardship on either the employer or the
union, federal law required accommodation of all deeply held
convictions, which the court described as follows:
One need not be a member of a recognized religious organiza-
tion nor is there any requirement that the religious objection
be a recognized tenet of any particular church or religious or-
ganization. It need not be logical or subject to analyzation, nor
is there any requirement that the belief be one of long stand-
ing. It only need be sincere.
9 4
3. Limitations on Expenditures.-Once a jurisdiction has
determined which employees are covered by union security pro-
visions, it must then decide which expenditures may properly be
made from exacted fees. Six states95 limit the amount of the
union service fee to an employee's pro rata share of the cost of
traditional bargaining activities: collective negotiations, contract
administration, and grievance adjustment. This limitation is the
least intensive and probably most reasonable implementation of
the "free rider" rationale "that each employee within the bar-
gaining unit [should] share in defraying the costs of the repre-
sentation . ..that the bargaining agent is required to provide
without discrimination." 98
In identifying expenses that appropriately fall within the
cost of representation, some tribunals do not question expenses
deemed to benefit all employees. 7 For example, the Minnesota
Public Employment Relations Board has said:
93. School Dist. of Grand Haven v. Grand Haven Ass'n of Educ. Secretaries, [1980]
813 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 46 (Mich. Cir. Ct. May 7, 1979). Plaintiffs cause of
action was based on 42 U.S.C. § 2000(j) (1976).
94. 813 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. at 46. The court added that the offer to pay another
organization refuted any "free rider" challenges. Id. at 47.
95. See note 72 supra.
96. Opinion of the Justices, 401 A.2d 135, 147 (Me. 1979).
97. In re Unfair Share Employees Org., [1980] 751 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 41
(Minn. Pub. Empl. Rel. Bd. Jan. 18, 1978).
1982]
15
Burt: Public Sector Labor Relations: Union Security Agreements in the P
Published by Scholar Commons, 1982
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REvIEw
We view the words "negotiate and administrate an agreement"
as a term of art which generally encompasses the entire collec-
tive bargaining and representational activities of the represen-
tative with the employer, including all preliminary planning,
preparation, training, budgeting and organizational efforts and
"tolling up" processes related to a negotiated contract, and ad-
ministering the same agreement after its consummation. It vir-
tually amounts to a residuum of the union's total activities af-
ter the "union membership benefits" have been isolated and
removed. This is the fair share of the collective bargaining
costs to be reflected in the service fee.98
If the boundaries of permissible costs seem cloudy, those of pro-
hibited costs are even less clear. Although a few states have en-
acted provisions that proscribe the use of fees for political or
ideological purposes,"9 most states have done little to resolve the
dilemma left by Abood. Given the inherently political nature of
public sector bargaining, where should the line be drawn? 00
Only three states have incorporated explicit prohibitions in their
statutory schemes. Montana, in the most abbreviated provision,
only forbids contributions to political candidates or parties at
the state and local levels. 101 New Jersey's broader statute, en-
acted in 1980,102 proscribes funding of any activities or causes of
a "partisan political or ideological nature, only incidentally re-
lated to the terms and conditions of employment."103 Neverthe-
less, in express recognition of the unique nature of public em-
ployment, the statute goes on to state that amounts refunded to
objecting employees should not include the costs of lobbying ac-
98. Id. at 43 (citing Hawaii Pub. Empl. Rel. Bd. No. 72 (1976)).
99. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 150E, § 12 (West Supp. 1981); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 39-31-402(3) (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.5(4)(c) (West Supp. 1980); N.Y.
Civ. SERV. LAW § 208(3)(a), (b) (McKinney Supp. 1980).
100. For example, the New York statute simply requires a refund for expenditures
"in aid of activities or causes of a political or ideological nature only incidentally related
to terms and conditions of employment." N.Y. CiV. SERV. LAw § 208(3)(a), (b) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1980). Interestingly, the Taylor Law was amended with the Abood decision in
mind. In view of the legislature's express desire to protect individual freedom of associa-
tion, it is strange that the provision was not more clearly worded. See Note, supra note
67, at 575 n.56.
101. MONT. REV. CODEs ANN. § 59-1605(1)(c) (Supp. 1977). This would appear much
too narrow for the St'eet standard, which would prohibit the financing of any particular
candidate. See note 28 supra.
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tivities "designed to foster policy goals in collective negotiations
and contract administration" or to secure additional employ-
ment advantages beyond those already gained through negotia-
tions with the public employer.1 04 The 1977 amendment to the
Massachusetts bargaining statute contains the most comprehen-
sive itemization of unacceptable political expenditures. 10 5 Un-
ions may not use objector's fees for (1) contributions to political
parties, candidates, or their committees; (2) publication of orga-
nizational preferences for those parties or candidates; (3) efforts
to enact, defeat, repeal, or amend legislation unrelated to em-
ployment conditions or to the "welfare or working environment"
of represented employees; (4) contributions to charitable, reli-
gious, or ideological causes not germane to representation; and
(5) benefits available only to union members. 10 6
Most jurisdictions lack such detailed legislative guidance
and leave the determination of legitimate expenditures to ad-
ministrative agencies charged with supervising the public bar-
gaining process. In Hawaii, unions are granted automatic service
fee deductions after certification but must first justify the
amount of those fees in an administrative hearing. 10 7 The Hawaii
Public Employment Relations Board has taken a pragmatic view
of the political role public unions must play to maintain their
existence by recognizing that legislative lobbying expenses are a
significant and inevitable cost of representation.10 8 Instead of
viewing bargaining as limited to across-the-table negotiations
with the executive branch, the Board takes the position that
"the legislature provides the wherewithal to fund all agreements
and retains control over working conditions . . . [and] has
104. Id.
105. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 150E, § 12 (West Supp. 1981).
106. Id. The list reveals the dangers of specificity. Perhaps in an attempt to over-
come the ambiguities of the statute, the Massachusetts Public Employee Relations
Board regulations enumerate additional activities that cannot be funded with compul-
sory dues: (1) social and recreational activities, (2) fines, penalties, or damages arising
from the unlawful acts of the bargaining agent or its officers, (3) educational activities
that are not germane to collective bargaining, (4) medical insurance, retirement benefits,
or similar programs for members only, and (5) organizational costs for nonunit employ-
ees. Mass. Pub. Empl. Rel. Bd. Regs., cited in J. GRODIN, D. WOLLETr, & R. ALLEYNE,
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 334 (1979).
107. HAWAII REv. STAT. § 89-4(a) (1976).
108. Hawaii State Teachers' Ass'n, [1978] 803 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 21-22
(Hawaii Pub. Empl. Rel. Bd. Nov. 27, 1978).
1982] 537
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merely delegated to the executive certain bargaining authority
. . . . It is the legislature who determines when the fruits of ne-
gotiations will ripen." 109
A few states have attempted to resolve another issue left
unsettled by Abood: the propriety of nonpolitical expenses that
either do not relate to collective bargaining or that pertain ex-
clusively to membership benefits.110 New York has ordered the
return of insurance premiums to agency payors excluded from
coverage under the policies those premiums support."' Hawaii
has disallowed numerous expenses, including thosefor newspa-
per space for publicized recreational activities or ideological is-
sues,1 2 newspaper subscriptions for nonunit members such as
retirees, 13 and union staff salary time attributable to nonger-
mane activities.114 The legitimacy of costs allocated to strike
funds appears to depend upon the legality of that mechanism in
the particular state.11 5
4. Rebate Procedures.-Deciding what constitutes a proper
rebate procedure for challenged. expenditures requires a balanc-
109. Id. The Board acknowledged that union fees should not include the costs of
lobbying and promoting broad social issues. Id.
110. In an unusual private sector case on this same issue, Ellis v. Railway Clerks,
[19761 91 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2339 (S.D. Cal. 1976), the district court found that the union
had breached its duty of fair representation by using agency shop fees and union dues
for noncollective bargaining purposes. Relying on the Street decision, the court found
the following expenditures illegal: (1) recreational or social functions not attended by
management; (2) the death benefit program; (3) organizational and recognitional activi-
ties directed at nonunit employees; (4) a publication primarily devoted to nongermane
coverage; (5) contributions to charities and ideological causes: (6) insurance, medical, and
legal service programs for members only; (7) union conventions; (8) the defense or prose-
cution of any "non-germane" litigation; and (9) support of or opposition to legislative
measures and executive orders, policies, and decisions. Id. at 2342. In effect, the court
construed Street to permit no more than a fair share use of compulsory fees over the
objections of the payors.
111. In re United University Professions, Pub. Empl. Rel. Bd. No. U-4457, re-
ported at [1981] 900 Gov'T EMPL. REL. Ran. (BNA) 20 (1980).
112. Hawaii Org. of Police Officers, [1980] 814 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 24
(Hawaii Pub. Empl. Rel. Bd. Apr. 17, 1980).
113. Hawaii State Teachers' Ass'n, [1979] 803 Gov'T EMPL. REL. Ran. (BNA) 21
(Hawaii Pub. Empl. Rel. Bd. Feb. 21, 1979).
114. Id.
115. Hawaii allows these costs. In re Hawaii Gov't Empl. Ass'n, [1979] 833 Gov'T
EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 18 (Hawaii Pub. Empl. Rel. Bd. Aug. 31, 1979). Michigan has
sustained attacks on such contributions by finding them tantamount to approval of ac-
tivities in direct contravention of its laws. Male v. Grand Rapids Educ. Ass'n, 98 Mich.
App. 742, 295 N.W.2d 918 (1980).
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ing of conflicting interests. The individual employee's constitu-
tional rights must be weighed against policies that encourage
union stability and promote common labor peace. Despite the
constitutional implications, courts seek remedies that can be
successfully implemented by the parties themselves without con-
tinuous judicial supervision.
116
At least one state, Hawaii, requires justification of compul-
sory service fees before their levy.11 7 The majority of states, how-
ever, adhere to the constitutional standard articulated in
Street""' and adopted by the Court in Abood:11 9 the opposing
employee must make an affirmative objection before dissent will
be assumed. 120 Once a cost has been protested as impermissible,
the burden shifts to the union to establish the legitimacy of its
expenditures.1 21 Although the Court in Abood suggested that the
union could first determine which of its expenditures were polit-
ical and then ascertain the ratio of these costs to its total outlays
and reduce employee fees by a like percentage,1 22 most courts
require the union to document and justify individual expenses,
including those spent on permissible uses. 23
A few courts have gone even further in protecting associa-
tional freedoms by forcing unions to place all challenged funds
116. These goals were articulated by the court in Ball v. City of Detroit, 84 Mich.
App. 383, 393, 269 N.W.2d 607, 611 (1978).
117. See notes 107-109 supra.
118. Street, 367 U.S. at 774.
119. Abood, 431 U.S. at 239.
120. E.g., Opinion of the Justices, 401 A.2d 135 (Me. 1979); Ball v. City of Detroit,
84 Mich. App. 383, 269 N.W.2d 607 (1978); Warner v. Board of Educ., 99 Misc. 2d 251,
415 N.Y.S.2d 939 (1979).
121. 431 U.S. at 239.
122. Id. at 240.
123. E.g., California School Empl. Ass'n v. Bowen, [1977-78] PuB. BARG. C. (CCH) 1
36,448; Warner v. Board of Educ., 99 Misc. 2d 251, 415 N.Y.S.2d 939 (1979). For a dis-
cussion of the different administrative burdens of each procedure, see Comment, supra
note 20, at 159. The courts in private sector cases have been particularly stringent on the
unions in this regard. In Beck v. Communications Workers, 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2323
(D. Md. 1981), a special master recommended that a union be permanently enjoined
from collecting more than 19% of future agency fees and that it make restitution of 81%
of all past fees. The master found that the union had failed to meet its burden of proof
in justifying most expenditures as contract-related because its records did not specifi-
cally indicate that portion of the fees allocated to chargeable expenses. Id. at 2325. The
court in Ellis v. Railway Clerks, [1980] 91 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2339 (S.D. Cal. 1980), also
required a union to document affirmatively all expenditures, including the time and ex-
penses of all affiliates.
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in escrow pending the outcome of a judicial inquiry."" Given the
potential duration of most litigation, the detrimental impact of
this requirement on the union's budget could be devastating. At
least one court has therefore held that the governmental interest
in union stability outweighs the individual rights concerned.
125
To avoid constitutional attacks, many unions have volunta-
rily developed internal procedures to facilitate the appeals of
dissenters.126 Some states require that they do so to become eli-
gible for compulsory agency or service fees. 27 The procedures
themselves, however, have often been challenged either because
their lengthy or insurmountable appeal mechanisms substan-
tially obstruct the resolution of disputes or because otherwise
satisfactory procedures have not been applied in a fair and im-
partial manner.
1 28
5. Other Minority Protections.-Some states have devised
alternatives to procedural challenges as a means of ensuring as-
sociational freedoms. Three states have laws requiring separate
ratification of union security clauses,'12  and two of them also
permit separate rescission of these clauses.""0 The vote appar-
ently may be initiated by the public employer or another union.
Wisconsin permits minority checkoffs despite the granting of a
fair share agreement to the exclusive representative.'3 Courts or
124. Ball v. City of Detroit, 84 Mich. App. 383, 269 N.W.2d 607 (1978); Minnesota
Fed'n of Teachers v. Minnesota Educ. Ass'n, 257 N.W.2d 822 (Minn. 1977).
125. Browne v. Milwaukee Bd. of School Directors, 83 Wis. 2d 316, 265 N.W.2d 559
(1978). Given the relatively small amount of each individual's contribution, it would be
difficult to show irreparable harm that would justify an injunction.
126. For a discussion of such procedures, see Comment, supra note 20, at n.147.
127. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.65 (West Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.2
(West Supp. 1981); N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 201(2) (McKinney Supp. 1980).
128. Although courts have upheld certain requirements as reasonable (protest by
certified mail, two-week time period within which to protest), they also have required
unions to provide an "impartial tribunal" sufficient to protect due process rights. 99
Misc. 2d at 257, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 945. But see Robbinsdale Educ. Ass'n v. Robbinsdale
Fed'n of Teachers, 307 Minn. 96, 239 N.W.2d 437 (1976), in which the court held that a
statute, by implicitly ensuring the right to notice of the service fees amount and the right
to a hearing on disputed portions, satisfied all due process requirements. Id. at 102, 239
N.W.2d at 445. Because the United States Supreme Court has vacated the Minnesota
order and remanded the case, the issue is not yet settled. See Threlkeld v. Robbinsdale
Fed'n. Teachers, 429 U.S. 880 (1976).
129. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3546 (West 1980); MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 12
(West Supp. 1981); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.80(2) (1974).
130. See statutes in note 119 supra.
131. Milwaukee Fed'n of Teachers v. WERC, 83 Wis. 2d 583, 266 N.W.2d 314
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administrative agencies in other states have strictly construed
against the union either statutory language'3 2 or terms of a par-ticular collective bargaining contract.133
V. CONCLUSION
The great majority of states either legislatively or judicially
prohibit compulsory unionism in the public sector as an unrea-
sonable exercise of governmental power and an unwarranted in-
trusion into the associational freedoms of both employers and
their employees. Nevertheless, approximately one-third of the
states, finding that at least some forms of union security serve
the public interest, have expressly adopted the opposite policy.
Any compulsory mechanism for the distribution of representa-
tion costs, however, necessarily impinges to some degree on the
associational freedom of the minority of employees who object to
either the agency relationship itself or the manner in which it is
conducted.
The Supreme Court held in Abood that such a compulsion
is constitutionally permissible if the rights of individuals to be
free from excessive sovereign coercion are balanced against the
governmental policies that give rise to the coercion. Certain
forms of union security seem to produce greater individual coer-
cion than any corresponding benefit to the public interest war-
rants. Requirements of actual membership or of financial sup-
port for activities beyond the scope of collective bargaining
appear to compel governmentally a kind of association normally
prohibited by the first amendment.
Even when the employee's support is limited to a "fair
share" of the costs of bargaining, contract administration, and
grievance adjustment, the scope of permissible expenditures has
eluded precise definition. The Supreme Court in Abood found
that the use of exacted fees or dues for political and ideological
purposes constituted an impermissible infringement of constitu-
tional rights but failed to identify the boundaries of prohibited
political uses. These boundaries are of paramount importance in
(1978).
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pressly to include such a remedy in the contract held to preclude its use).
19821
21
Burt: Public Sector Labor Relations: Union Security Agreements in the P
Published by Scholar Commons, 1982
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the public sector where government not only defines the scope of
collective bargaining but also fashions the rules for its conduct
and ultimately determines who may participate.
Many courts have responded to this dilemma by attempting
to define more clearly the forbidden sphere of political activity.
Partisan support or the promotion of broad social policy posi-
tions only marginally related to employment should be pro-
scribed. Legislative lobbying and other political activities, how-
ever, which may result in direct benefit to the represented
employees, pose a more difficult problem. Employees should be
adequately protected if the use of their fees is limited to politi-
cal lobbying or activities whose immediate object is demonstra-
bly within the authorized or permissible scope of bargaining.
A growing trend appears to limit service fee uses to truly
representational purposes. To achieve this end, courts have, al-
most without exception, forced unions to justify their expendi-
tures in considerable detail and awarded refunds for failure to
do so. They also have uniformly required the existence of acces-
sible and nondiscriminatory procedures to facilitate employee
challenges to the use of their money.
The struggle to define the limits of union security in the
public sector has, for many, symbolized the struggle to define
the proper limitation on governmental control of the individual.
The line drawn between acceptable and excessive government
coercion depends upon a delicate balancing of public and private
interests. The power of the government to draw that line has
traditionally been restrained by the constitutional privileges and
freedoms accorded individuals. So long as union security agree-
ments require no more than the limited financial support of ac-
tual union representation, however, any resulting associational
infringement does not rise to a constitutional level and is war-
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